Philadelphia Learjet 55 Crash: Spatial Disorientation Clues & Wrong-Runway Landings

In Episode 37 of NTSB News Talk, Max Trescott and Rob Mark examine newly released evidence from the fatal Philadelphia Learjet 55 crash, along with a series of accidents demonstrating the dangers of spatial disorientation, continuation bias, runway confusion, inadequate briefings, and poor decision-making close to the ground.

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The centerpiece of the episode is the January 31, 2025 crash of Learjet 55 XA-UCI shortly after departure from Northeast Philadelphia Airport. The aircraft was operating as a Jet Rescue Air Ambulance flight. All six people aboard were killed, along with one person on the ground.

The NTSB has now released its investigative docket, which contains dozens of documents providing substantially more information about the final seconds of the flight.

The Learjet departed Runway 24 at night with an overcast ceiling of approximately 400 feet. The crew had been instructed to turn right to a heading of 290 degrees.

The first available ADS-B data showed the airplane at roughly 400 feet above the ground, climbing at approximately 2,300 feet per minute and traveling about 191 knots. Initially, the Learjet banked right as expected, reaching roughly 22 degrees of bank.

Then something changed.

Instead of continuing the right turn, the airplane gradually rolled back through level and began banking left. One of the most intriguing findings is how slowly that roll developed. For approximately 20 to 25 seconds, the airplane rolled at only about two degrees per second.

That matters because the NTSB’s human-performance investigation discusses somatogyral illusion. When an airplane rolls slowly enough, the inner ear may not detect the motion. A pilot can therefore feel as though the airplane remains straight and level even while the actual bank angle is steadily increasing.

The timing also raises questions about distraction and workload. The developing loss of control occurred just as the Learjet was entering the clouds and the crew was being handed off from the tower to departure control—a point in the flight when continuous instrument scanning is especially important.

The situation then deteriorated rapidly. The Learjet climbed only to about 1,325 feet above the ground before its bank exceeded 90 degrees. The nose dropped, and by the final ADS-B point the airplane was descending at nearly 10,000 feet per minute and traveling about 300 knots.

Investigators also examined another vestibular illusion known as somatogravic illusion. Acceleration can make a pilot perceive that the nose is pitching upward. Near the end of this flight, calculations indicated that acceleration forces could have produced a powerful nose-up sensation even though the Learjet was actually descending steeply.

There are other intriguing clues. The pitch trim was not found in the expected takeoff position, although investigators found no evidence that the trim mechanism had mechanically failed. Training records also noted previous issues involving automation management while hand-flying and a tendency to react before fully evaluating a situation.

At the same time, mechanical evidence argues against an engine failure. Both engines appeared to be operating at approximately takeoff power, and the airplane continued gaining total energy.

Critical information is nevertheless missing. The cockpit voice recorder was not recording the accident flight, and the airplane did not have a flight data recorder. Investigators therefore cannot determine exactly who was flying, whether the autopilot was engaged, which automation modes were selected, what the pilots were discussing, or when the pitch trim changed.

The NTSB has not yet issued a probable cause.

The episode also examines two wrong-runway landings near Chicago that demonstrate another human-factors hazard: continuation bias.

In one case, N1128M Learjet 60, approaching Chicago Executive Airport at night mistook Runway 30 for Runway 34. The crew did not recognize the error until after touchdown, and the airplane ultimately ran off the runway and struck a perimeter fence.

In another incident, N772MR (Envoy 3936) ERJ-170 was cleared for Runway 10 Center at Chicago O’Hare but instead aligned with and landed on Runway 10 Left. The crew was having trouble receiving the expected ILS identification, became increasingly task saturated, and continued visually.

Remarkably, the tower controller recognized the aircraft was lined up with the wrong runway but allowed it to land there because no conflicting traffic was present. The NTSB criticized that decision, noting that controllers who observe an aircraft aligned with the wrong surface are supposed to advise the crew and issue appropriate instructions.

Other accidents in Episode 37 include a Cirrus Vision Jet accident at Driggs-Reed Memorial Airport that began takeoff on a closed portion of the runway and struck a water pipe positioned across it; a fatal collision between a Cessna 150 and a Pennsylvania State Police Bell 407 helicopter hovering alongside the runway at Carlisle Airport; and N1850N a Beechcraft Duchess accident during a simulated single-engine approach in Washington.

The episode also looks at an unusual fatal glider N8217W accident in Virginia. A photographer standing near the aircraft’s path was struck by the glider’s wing as it taxied after landing. The accident demonstrates how easily someone focused on a fuselage—or looking through a camera—can misjudge the enormous lateral space occupied by a glider wing.

Together, these accidents reinforce a recurring theme: pilots must continually challenge what they think they see and what they think the airplane is doing. Spatial disorientation can make the body lie, while continuation bias can make the mind disregard evidence that no longer fits the plan.