Feb. 18, 2025

E139: How HIG Went from $75 Million to $67 Billion AUM

E139: How HIG Went from $75 Million to $67 Billion AUM
The player is loading ...
E139: How HIG Went from $75 Million to $67 Billion AUM

In this episode of How I Invest, I engage with Jackson Craig, Managing Director and Co-Head of H.I.G. Bayside's U.S. Special Situations and Distressed Debt Strategy. With over 20 years of experience in private equity investing, Jackson shares his expertise on navigating distressed debt markets, building resilient portfolios, and uncovering hidden opportunities in complex financial situations. From sourcing distressed assets to managing risk, Jackson offers a masterclass on investing in challenging environments.

Highlights: H.I.G. Capital’s Growth: How the firm expanded from a $75 million fund in 1993 to managing over $67 billion across multiple asset classes, including private equity, real estate, infrastructure, and credit.

Understanding Distressed Debt: The mechanics of distressed debt investing, including yield benchmarks and risk perceptions in distressed securities.

Risk Management in Distressed Investing: How H.I.G. constructs portfolios with a high hit rate and limited downside by focusing on first-lien debt.

Sourcing Distressed Opportunities: The unique ways distressed debt investors find deals—often without companies even being aware of the transactions.

Building Strategic Relationships: Why success in distressed debt relies on long-term relationships with restructuring attorneys, turnaround consultants, and industry insiders.

Portfolio Diversification Beyond Industries: The importance of avoiding over concentration in single risk factors, such as interest rates or energy prices, rather than just industry or geography.

The Role of Optimism in Distressed Investing: Why successful investors need to see beyond the immediate problems to uncover long-term value.

Lessons from 16 Years at H.I.G.: Jackson’s biggest takeaways, including why leadership stability is often a key indicator of a company’s strength.

H.I.G.'s Investment Philosophy: A deep dive into the firm’s focus on small and mid-cap, value-oriented, cash flow-centric investments and its commitment to seeking out complexity.

--

Guest Bio: Jackson Craig is the Managing Director and Co-Head of H.I.G. Bayside's U.S. Special Situations and Distressed Debt Strategy, overseeing investments in special situations, restructuring, and turnaround opportunities. With over 20 years of experience in private equity investing, Jackson has been instrumental in the firm’s growth and success in alternative investments. His expertise spans private equity, credit markets, and distressed investing, making him a leading voice in the industry.

Our Podcast now receives more than 200,000 downloads a month. Are you interested in sponsoring an episode? Please email David Weisburd at dweisburd@gmail.com.

We’d like to thank @JuniperSquare and @ReedSmith for sponsoring this episode!

#VentureCapital #VC #Startups #OpenLP #AssetManagement

--

Sponsor: Juniper Square is dedicated to transforming the private markets investing experience. The company provides a full range of modern, connected fund technologies and services for over 2,100 private markets GPs across fundraising, reporting, fund administration, treasury, compliance, and business intelligence. Today, over $1 trillion of assets and 600,000+ LP accounts are managed through Juniper Square software and fund administration services. Learn more at www.junipersquare.com.

Sponsor: Reed Smith is a dynamic international law firm dedicated to helping clients move their businesses forward. With an inclusive culture and innovative mindset, Reed Smith delivers smarter, more creative legal services that drive better outcomes for their clients. Their deep industry knowledge, long-standing relationships and collaborative structure make them the go-to partner for complex disputes, transactions, and regulatory matters. Learn more at www.reedsmith.com.

--

Stay Connected: Twitter: David Weisburd: @dweisburd

LinkedIn: David Weisburd: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dweisburd/ Jackson Craig: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jackson-craig-458b645b/

Links H.I.G. Capital: www.higcapital.com

Questions or topics you want us to discuss on How I Invest? Email us at dweisburd@gmail.com.

(0:00) Episode preview (1:25) Understanding distressed debt investment (4:53) Identifying and assessing distressed debt opportunities (7:24) Investment process and due diligence (9:02) Sponsor: Juniper Square (9:36) Relationship management and distressed sales (10:39) Tax considerations and investor base (11:33) Investment discipline in distressed debt (12:36) Success factors in distressed debt investing (14:43) Portfolio diversification and risk management (19:03) Sponsor: Reed Smith (19:38) Evaluating business quality and management in distress (21:02) Navigating the bankruptcy process (22:02) Long-term strategy in distressed investing (23:19) Overcoming sourcing challenges (23:48) HIG's distinct investment approach and LP feedback (25:21) Competitive advantage in distressed markets (25:45) Closing remarks
Transcript
1
00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:04,660
You've been at HIG for sixteen years, and the
firm has really grown through your tenure.

2
00:00:04,799 --> 00:00:09,119
Tell me about how HIG has grown over the
sixteen years that you've been there.

3
00:00:09,119 --> 00:00:10,339
HIG is a platform.

4
00:00:10,800 --> 00:00:15,299
Starting in 1993, '70 '5 million first fund,
very strong performance.

5
00:00:16,004 --> 00:00:23,204
Fast forward to today, 67,000,000,000 in assets
under management, 19 offices, over 500 investor

6
00:00:23,204 --> 00:00:23,704
professionals.

7
00:00:24,244 --> 00:00:29,609
And in addition to private equity, a fully
developed alternative credit platform with both

8
00:00:29,690 --> 00:00:35,049
stress debt and direct lending, a real estate
effort, an infrastructure effort, and a growth

9
00:00:35,049 --> 00:00:39,149
equity effort, and all of those in US, Europe,
and Latin America.

10
00:00:42,585 --> 00:00:47,865
HIG has really grown from a small private
equity fund decades ago to a $68,000,000,000

11
00:00:47,865 --> 00:00:48,925
behemoth today.

12
00:00:48,984 --> 00:00:50,604
How did HIG grow?

13
00:00:50,905 --> 00:00:53,005
First and foremost, performance.

14
00:00:53,704 --> 00:00:59,340
And so very strong performance, especially in
the flagship equity product, top decile for a

15
00:00:59,340 --> 00:01:00,240
number of years.

16
00:01:00,619 --> 00:01:04,540
Really, really strong investor demand that
allowed the firm to say, okay.

17
00:01:04,540 --> 00:01:06,060
We can raise more capital.

18
00:01:06,060 --> 00:01:10,299
Investors are asking us to manage more money,
but we don't wanna lose our discipline.

19
00:01:10,299 --> 00:01:11,739
We don't wanna grow out of our space.

20
00:01:11,739 --> 00:01:13,064
How do we accomplish that?

21
00:01:13,305 --> 00:01:14,525
We need to grow geographically.

22
00:01:14,584 --> 00:01:17,564
We need to grow into adjacencies, and so that's
what they did.

23
00:01:17,704 --> 00:01:23,305
They really grew grew laterally into these
strategies and then geographically first into

24
00:01:23,305 --> 00:01:25,325
Europe and then second in Latin America.

25
00:01:25,590 --> 00:01:29,769
So your co head of HIG's distress strategy,
what is distressed debt?

26
00:01:30,390 --> 00:01:31,109
Good question.

27
00:01:31,109 --> 00:01:37,109
The traditional definition of distressed debt
is debt with a yield a thousand basis points or

28
00:01:37,109 --> 00:01:39,369
more greater than the reference treasury.

29
00:01:39,430 --> 00:01:40,890
So what do I mean by that?

30
00:01:41,135 --> 00:01:46,655
For a five year corporate bond, if the five
year US treasury is yielding 4%, that corporate

31
00:01:46,655 --> 00:01:50,814
bond would need to have a yield of 14%, ten
percentage points, a thousand basis points

32
00:01:50,814 --> 00:01:53,775
greater than the treasury in order to be
considered distressed.

33
00:01:53,775 --> 00:01:57,670
That's the benchmark that people use to
distinguish between that debts that's

34
00:01:57,670 --> 00:01:59,030
distressed and that's that's not.

35
00:01:59,030 --> 00:02:03,590
That's where people draw the line, which might
ask you to beg the question, why would debt

36
00:02:03,590 --> 00:02:04,810
have such a high yield?

37
00:02:04,950 --> 00:02:09,189
It's really in in in yields that start to
approach what you would expect to see for total

38
00:02:09,189 --> 00:02:10,650
returns on equity securities.

39
00:02:11,270 --> 00:02:15,674
The reason for that is a perception of the
probability of default and an impairment of

40
00:02:15,674 --> 00:02:16,074
recovery.

41
00:02:16,074 --> 00:02:18,715
So is this debt gonna pay interest for the full
life of it?

42
00:02:18,715 --> 00:02:19,674
Maybe maybe not.

43
00:02:19,674 --> 00:02:20,974
The borrower's a little shaky.

44
00:02:21,435 --> 00:02:25,909
Is value gonna be sufficient to cause this debt
to be repaid in full at par in cash on or

45
00:02:25,909 --> 00:02:27,110
before the maturity date?

46
00:02:27,110 --> 00:02:27,990
Maybe, maybe not.

47
00:02:27,990 --> 00:02:29,449
The borrower's a little shaky.

48
00:02:29,830 --> 00:02:34,949
And so that increased perception of risk, that
increased probability of default is what causes

49
00:02:34,949 --> 00:02:36,810
debt to trade at these very high yields.

50
00:02:37,525 --> 00:02:38,585
I'm very intrigued.

51
00:02:38,805 --> 00:02:42,425
You said the perception of risk on an HIG
portfolio.

52
00:02:42,564 --> 00:02:44,724
How much of the portfolio are you expecting to
go to zero?

53
00:02:44,724 --> 00:02:45,685
How much to pay back?

54
00:02:45,685 --> 00:02:48,485
And tell me about how you construct a portfolio
around that.

55
00:02:48,485 --> 00:02:48,645
Yeah.

56
00:02:48,645 --> 00:02:49,525
It's a good question.

57
00:02:49,525 --> 00:02:53,250
We have a pretty specific and distinct approach
to investing.

58
00:02:53,310 --> 00:02:55,250
And so our hit rate is very high.

59
00:02:55,629 --> 00:02:59,010
And when we do take losses, they tend to be
fairly light.

60
00:02:59,069 --> 00:03:04,590
You know, very rarely, I mean, maybe once or
twice in in in my sixteen years here, maybe

61
00:03:04,590 --> 00:03:06,254
less, have we lost all our money.

62
00:03:06,495 --> 00:03:10,335
We focus on first lien debt, so top of the
capital structure, first in line in the

63
00:03:10,335 --> 00:03:11,794
waterfall to get paid off.

64
00:03:12,335 --> 00:03:18,094
We focus on debt that we think is maybe outside
of enter outside of debt capacity, but inside

65
00:03:18,094 --> 00:03:20,355
the total enterprise value of the borrower.

66
00:03:20,509 --> 00:03:25,229
And so while there's some equity risk to it, we
think the totality of the enterprise value is

67
00:03:25,229 --> 00:03:26,509
sufficient to cover our debt.

68
00:03:26,509 --> 00:03:32,030
Our model is much more focused on the safest,
least risky, top of the capital structure, and

69
00:03:32,030 --> 00:03:34,449
try to buy things inside of enterprise value.

70
00:03:34,794 --> 00:03:38,875
Just to simplify that, you might have a company
that's worth 500,000,000 and has a hundred

71
00:03:38,875 --> 00:03:40,254
million in debt.

72
00:03:40,555 --> 00:03:43,834
You're not nowhere near kind of the
$500,000,000 in equity value.

73
00:03:43,834 --> 00:03:49,900
So even if the company goes down equity value,
you're still you're still gonna get paid back.

74
00:03:50,120 --> 00:03:50,759
Exactly right.

75
00:03:50,759 --> 00:03:56,360
And so prototypical capital structure, if it's
a healthy stable business, debt capacity might

76
00:03:56,360 --> 00:03:59,180
be 60 to 70% of total enterprise value.

77
00:03:59,314 --> 00:04:04,034
Well, look, the face amount of the first lien
debt that we're looking to buy constitutes 90%

78
00:04:04,034 --> 00:04:05,335
of the enterprise value.

79
00:04:05,395 --> 00:04:09,634
We've got a 10% equity cushion beyond the face
amount of the debt, and we're purchasing it for

80
00:04:09,634 --> 00:04:11,460
something significantly less than that.

81
00:04:11,700 --> 00:04:18,180
But if we're buying it at, say, 80¢, portion of
our cost in a certainly a portion of our claim

82
00:04:18,180 --> 00:04:22,040
is in the equity part of the capital structure,
that junior tranche.

83
00:04:22,660 --> 00:04:28,394
And being first lien debt, who's senior to you
and who is subordinated to you?

84
00:04:28,535 --> 00:04:31,175
In almost every case, no one will be senior to
you.

85
00:04:31,175 --> 00:04:32,615
You're top of the capital structure.

86
00:04:32,615 --> 00:04:33,574
You're first in line.

87
00:04:33,574 --> 00:04:34,294
Even bank?

88
00:04:34,294 --> 00:04:38,634
The bank is typically that first lien debt, and
so bank debt is where we focus.

89
00:04:39,319 --> 00:04:43,639
Then you're gonna have, most times, junior debt
being a second lien piece of paper, an

90
00:04:43,639 --> 00:04:44,759
unsecured piece of paper.

91
00:04:44,759 --> 00:04:48,620
Maybe it's converts, maybe it's mezz, what have
you, and then the equity tranche.

92
00:04:48,920 --> 00:04:50,360
So let's take a step back.

93
00:04:50,360 --> 00:04:52,460
How do you source your opportunities?

94
00:04:53,035 --> 00:04:56,415
Sourcing is is important, and distressed is a
funny asset class.

95
00:04:56,875 --> 00:05:00,654
For private equity and direct lending, the
company is a party to the transaction.

96
00:05:01,035 --> 00:05:01,995
They're supportive of it.

97
00:05:01,995 --> 00:05:03,134
They've hired a banker.

98
00:05:03,274 --> 00:05:05,055
The banker markets the transaction.

99
00:05:05,800 --> 00:05:07,399
Stressed debt is not bad at all.

100
00:05:07,639 --> 00:05:09,259
First off, the company's in trouble.

101
00:05:09,399 --> 00:05:11,500
Second off, they're not a party to the
transaction.

102
00:05:11,560 --> 00:05:15,100
When you're buying debt, you're buying debt
from an existing lender.

103
00:05:15,240 --> 00:05:17,180
The company is exterior to that.

104
00:05:17,654 --> 00:05:20,074
They, in many cases, don't even know it's
happened.

105
00:05:20,455 --> 00:05:25,194
There's no banker out there marketing it, and,
you know, they say success has a thousand

106
00:05:25,335 --> 00:05:27,035
fathers and failure has none.

107
00:05:27,095 --> 00:05:30,214
Not a lot of people out there actively
marketing distressed situations.

108
00:05:30,214 --> 00:05:33,240
If anything, they're trying to cover it up or
hide it, and they're certainly not bragging

109
00:05:33,240 --> 00:05:33,960
about it.

110
00:05:33,960 --> 00:05:37,259
And so you've gotta do a little bit of work to
go find distressed situations.

111
00:05:37,480 --> 00:05:39,660
And so we really focus on three venues.

112
00:05:40,680 --> 00:05:45,180
The first, and this maybe is overly simplistic,
is we keep an eye on underperforming companies.

113
00:05:46,004 --> 00:05:47,365
We focus on the lever businesses.

114
00:05:47,365 --> 00:05:51,365
They tend to be sponsored around, and then we
keep an eye on both companies that are

115
00:05:51,365 --> 00:05:54,584
underperforming as well as sectors that are
facing headwinds.

116
00:05:54,725 --> 00:05:59,889
Because if you have a population of private
equity owned companies with heavy debt loads in

117
00:05:59,889 --> 00:06:04,449
the sector that they're in is facing headwinds,
whatever it might be, some subset of those are

118
00:06:04,449 --> 00:06:05,569
likely to become distressed.

119
00:06:05,569 --> 00:06:07,910
So that's a good place for us to go spend time.

120
00:06:08,769 --> 00:06:14,625
Secondly, there's a community of turnaround
consultants, restructuring bankers, and

121
00:06:14,625 --> 00:06:15,685
bankruptcy lawyers.

122
00:06:16,225 --> 00:06:18,645
It's a fairly small community at a certain
level.

123
00:06:18,944 --> 00:06:19,904
We all know each other.

124
00:06:19,904 --> 00:06:22,324
We all see each other in cases time and again.

125
00:06:22,384 --> 00:06:26,004
We've got some very deep and long standing
relationships with those people.

126
00:06:26,259 --> 00:06:30,439
We have good two way flow of information and
ideas and perspectives.

127
00:06:30,580 --> 00:06:37,000
And then lastly and maybe most importantly,
look, HIG is a large company.

128
00:06:37,220 --> 00:06:39,720
We own we have a large number of portfolio
companies.

129
00:06:39,814 --> 00:06:42,875
We have an even larger number of companies
we've owned in the past.

130
00:06:43,334 --> 00:06:47,974
And so we spend a lot of time talking to those
management teams, talking to the banker

131
00:06:47,974 --> 00:06:50,615
relationships, talking to the the the c suite.

132
00:06:50,615 --> 00:06:52,214
Who in your industry is doing well?

133
00:06:52,214 --> 00:06:53,194
Who's doing poorly?

134
00:06:53,579 --> 00:06:57,419
Who maybe is a good company that made a
mistake, entered into a bad contract, or did a

135
00:06:57,419 --> 00:06:58,160
bad acquisition?

136
00:06:58,459 --> 00:07:00,779
Well, how about your customers and how about
your vendors?

137
00:07:00,779 --> 00:07:03,919
Who of those are are struggling or where should
we be focused?

138
00:07:04,139 --> 00:07:08,475
And then when we find an opportunity, we'll
work with those teams to really understand it

139
00:07:08,475 --> 00:07:13,835
at a granular kind of ground level talking to
an operating team that oftentimes is in that

140
00:07:13,835 --> 00:07:14,335
industry.

141
00:07:14,634 --> 00:07:19,835
And so the the the HIG platform, the portfolio,
and all the expertise and experience that we

142
00:07:19,835 --> 00:07:24,100
have is is the third area we focus on for
sourcing and and probably the most important.

143
00:07:24,639 --> 00:07:28,720
Let's say that you talk to the management teams
at HIG and they've highlighted a couple

144
00:07:28,720 --> 00:07:29,199
companies.

145
00:07:29,199 --> 00:07:30,259
What do you do next?

146
00:07:30,560 --> 00:07:32,925
From there, we're gonna go look at the lender
base.

147
00:07:33,004 --> 00:07:37,324
We're gonna get information either from the
lenders or other sources, understand the

148
00:07:37,324 --> 00:07:38,305
financial picture.

149
00:07:38,685 --> 00:07:45,404
And what we look for is either the existence or
the expectation of a dynamic to develop that we

150
00:07:45,404 --> 00:07:49,199
would expect to cause lenders to sell debt to
us, ultimately, at a discount.

151
00:07:49,259 --> 00:07:50,079
That's key.

152
00:07:50,459 --> 00:07:52,300
Ultimately, we buy debt at a discount.

153
00:07:52,300 --> 00:07:54,939
In order to do that, someone has to be willing
to sell it to us.

154
00:07:54,939 --> 00:08:00,860
And so you have to find those those situations
and circumstances, where those conditions exist

155
00:08:00,860 --> 00:08:03,464
or you can reasonably expect them to exist.

156
00:08:03,524 --> 00:08:05,285
And so we spend a lot of time on that.

157
00:08:05,285 --> 00:08:07,705
That's heavy modeling and heavy diligence.

158
00:08:08,084 --> 00:08:13,205
You know, because the companies aren't a party
to the transaction, we can't just call up the

159
00:08:13,205 --> 00:08:14,884
CFO and ask them a hundred questions.

160
00:08:15,125 --> 00:08:17,625
They don't have a data room available for us.

161
00:08:17,670 --> 00:08:22,949
There's a real element of detective work or
investigative journalism to what we do to build

162
00:08:22,949 --> 00:08:27,210
a body of facts to be able to derive an
investment decision from an investment thesis.

163
00:08:27,670 --> 00:08:32,904
Once we've done that, we'll either reach out to
lenders usually through an intermediary or if

164
00:08:32,904 --> 00:08:36,184
we're right in the way the situation's
developing, frankly, they're reaching out to

165
00:08:36,184 --> 00:08:39,325
us, and then we'll start to negotiate to
purchase debt.

166
00:08:40,184 --> 00:08:44,045
You have this almost paradoxical situation
where you're trying to build relationships

167
00:08:44,799 --> 00:08:46,080
through distressed sales.

168
00:08:46,080 --> 00:08:47,200
It's almost a paradox.

169
00:08:47,200 --> 00:08:47,440
Right?

170
00:08:47,440 --> 00:08:52,879
You think of distressed sales as, you know,
very zero sum situations, but you've built this

171
00:08:52,879 --> 00:08:55,860
ecosystem of relationships of repeat business.

172
00:08:56,160 --> 00:09:01,225
How do you manage the needs of the immediate
transaction with the overall relationships?

173
00:09:02,325 --> 00:09:04,904
Managing a venture capital firm is complex.

174
00:09:05,284 --> 00:09:08,325
Fundraising, reporting, compliance, it all adds
up.

175
00:09:08,325 --> 00:09:10,084
But what if there was a smarter way?

176
00:09:10,084 --> 00:09:14,105
Juniper Square is transforming the private
market's investing experience.

177
00:09:14,700 --> 00:09:20,460
More than 2,100 GPs trust Juniper Square's
connected software and services in order to

178
00:09:20,460 --> 00:09:25,899
raise capital more efficiently, reduce
operational risk, and deliver a world class LP

179
00:09:25,899 --> 00:09:26,399
experience.

180
00:09:26,964 --> 00:09:29,784
Want the freedom to focus on delivering
investor results?

181
00:09:30,245 --> 00:09:35,625
Visit junipersquare.com/vc to get in touch with
the Juniper Square team today.

182
00:09:36,164 --> 00:09:36,725
You're right.

183
00:09:36,964 --> 00:09:42,120
And and and one of the aspects of what we do is
we almost never own all the debt, and we own a

184
00:09:42,120 --> 00:09:43,639
portion of the of the credit facility.

185
00:09:43,639 --> 00:09:46,600
And so when you're when you're talking to
borrowers, when you're going through whatever

186
00:09:46,600 --> 00:09:50,700
process you may or may not be going through,
you're working with other lenders.

187
00:09:51,079 --> 00:09:52,440
It's a cooperative process.

188
00:09:52,440 --> 00:09:53,579
It's usually a committee.

189
00:09:53,735 --> 00:09:57,815
You need to work together because you all own
the same debt to get to the best answer for for

190
00:09:57,815 --> 00:09:58,215
all of you.

191
00:09:58,215 --> 00:10:00,154
And by the way, you didn't choose to work
together.

192
00:10:00,535 --> 00:10:01,254
We just bought in.

193
00:10:01,254 --> 00:10:05,735
We oftentimes, we don't know who else holds it
until, lenders are organized.

194
00:10:05,735 --> 00:10:07,595
It's a little bit like a surprise party.

195
00:10:07,820 --> 00:10:08,860
We're in your dark room.

196
00:10:08,860 --> 00:10:12,539
You don't know who the other guests are until
someone turns the lights on, and then you look

197
00:10:12,539 --> 00:10:14,559
around and say, oh, you're at this party too.

198
00:10:15,179 --> 00:10:16,539
But it's a small world.

199
00:10:16,539 --> 00:10:20,700
The way we manage it is just try to be
forthright and say, here's what we're doing.

200
00:10:20,700 --> 00:10:21,740
Here's why we're doing it.

201
00:10:21,740 --> 00:10:23,715
Here's why we think it's the right thing to do.

202
00:10:24,195 --> 00:10:26,035
It's a small world, and it's a long life.

203
00:10:26,035 --> 00:10:30,915
And so, you know, I I started my career at
Morgan Stanley, and one of the old sayings

204
00:10:30,915 --> 00:10:33,495
there was doing first class business in a first
class way.

205
00:10:33,634 --> 00:10:35,154
You don't queue too far from that.

206
00:10:35,154 --> 00:10:36,375
You're gonna be okay.

207
00:10:36,835 --> 00:10:38,934
Just doing things in a forthright manner.

208
00:10:39,209 --> 00:10:40,649
You have a unique product in that.

209
00:10:40,649 --> 00:10:46,490
You have nice kind of teens return, but there's
obviously it's not very tax efficient.

210
00:10:46,490 --> 00:10:48,730
Does that impact your LP base?

211
00:10:48,730 --> 00:10:52,065
Is it mostly kind of a nontaxable LP base?

212
00:10:52,304 --> 00:10:52,784
It is.

213
00:10:52,784 --> 00:10:57,504
And, you know, if you look at our our return
stream, broadly speaking, about 50% of it is

214
00:10:57,504 --> 00:11:01,125
from interest income and about 50% of it is
from capital appreciation.

215
00:11:02,144 --> 00:11:03,024
And so you're right.

216
00:11:03,024 --> 00:11:05,605
It's not the most tax efficient way to invest.

217
00:11:06,465 --> 00:11:13,820
We do Our LP base does gravitate towards tax
exempts, not a %, but it does go that way.

218
00:11:14,200 --> 00:11:20,039
Conversely, some taxable investors, family
offices, high net worth, even though it's less

219
00:11:20,039 --> 00:11:24,235
tax efficient, seem to really value the current
income component of our strategy.

220
00:11:24,535 --> 00:11:28,934
And so that offsets it a little bit, but, yes,
we do have a maybe higher than average tax

221
00:11:28,934 --> 00:11:33,450
exempt concentration in our LP base.

222
00:11:33,690 --> 00:11:36,889
You guys make a thesis and see if you're on
track.

223
00:11:36,889 --> 00:11:41,129
How do you create the discipline to make sure
that you're not revising what your thesis was,

224
00:11:41,129 --> 00:11:43,710
and how do you institutionalize that in your
process?

225
00:11:43,929 --> 00:11:44,970
Thank you for listening.

226
00:11:44,970 --> 00:11:48,825
To join our community and to make sure you do
not miss any future episodes, please click the

227
00:11:48,825 --> 00:11:50,445
follow button above to subscribe.

228
00:11:51,384 --> 00:11:52,745
This is creep as a thing.

229
00:11:52,745 --> 00:11:56,764
And, yes, it is human nature to retrospectively
wanna be right.

230
00:11:56,904 --> 00:11:59,644
And so we what we do is we do it
quantitatively.

231
00:12:00,179 --> 00:12:04,820
And so for every investment we make, we have, a
three statement projection model.

232
00:12:04,820 --> 00:12:06,820
It goes into the investment committee deck.

233
00:12:06,820 --> 00:12:08,179
We then take that model.

234
00:12:08,179 --> 00:12:09,080
It's done quarterly.

235
00:12:09,379 --> 00:12:14,295
In each subsequent quarter, we compare the
company's financial report with their actually

236
00:12:14,295 --> 00:12:17,835
did to what we thought they did at that time on
a quantitative basis.

237
00:12:18,455 --> 00:12:25,014
And so by just doing it with data and hard
numbers based on what we originally thought, we

238
00:12:25,014 --> 00:12:28,315
get a, a very clear yardstick on how they're
performing.

239
00:12:28,750 --> 00:12:30,269
And so that's what we do.

240
00:12:30,269 --> 00:12:35,790
That's our discipline to prevent ourselves from
from kinda recasting the thesis as, subsequent

241
00:12:35,790 --> 00:12:36,610
events unfold.

242
00:12:36,830 --> 00:12:41,090
You've been in this asset class for twenty
seven years, sixteen of those at HIG.

243
00:12:41,684 --> 00:12:45,144
What are the characteristics that make somebody
great at distressed debt?

244
00:12:47,605 --> 00:12:48,345
Good question.

245
00:12:49,205 --> 00:12:50,585
I'd say two things.

246
00:12:51,764 --> 00:12:55,205
One is and this is gonna sound counterintuitive
maybe.

247
00:12:55,205 --> 00:12:56,745
You need to be a little bit of an optimist.

248
00:12:57,419 --> 00:12:58,940
Every distress situation is bad.

249
00:12:58,940 --> 00:12:59,259
Right?

250
00:12:59,259 --> 00:13:01,500
It's it's it's it's not called everything's
great.

251
00:13:01,500 --> 00:13:02,860
It's called distress for a reason.

252
00:13:02,860 --> 00:13:04,320
There's gonna be some problems.

253
00:13:04,779 --> 00:13:09,259
And you have to be kind of in a level headed
way able to to look at those problems,

254
00:13:09,259 --> 00:13:13,565
acknowledge them, but also see beyond them to
the potential or see beyond them to other

255
00:13:13,565 --> 00:13:14,605
pockets of value.

256
00:13:14,764 --> 00:13:17,024
And so it takes a certain level of positivity.

257
00:13:17,084 --> 00:13:20,365
It's very easy to look at a bad situation and
say that's bad.

258
00:13:20,365 --> 00:13:22,065
I don't wanna touch it and move on.

259
00:13:22,605 --> 00:13:25,289
But no one gets paid to be a professional deal
assassin.

260
00:13:25,370 --> 00:13:25,529
Right?

261
00:13:25,529 --> 00:13:28,509
No one no one's interested in someone who only
kills deals.

262
00:13:29,370 --> 00:13:35,449
We're, hired to invest our LPs money, and so we
need to find opportunities to invest.

263
00:13:35,449 --> 00:13:39,424
And that takes a certain level of creativity,
takes a certain level of optimism.

264
00:13:39,644 --> 00:13:44,304
And then the second characteristic I would
point to that that I think is pretty important,

265
00:13:44,924 --> 00:13:50,225
besides the basics of of kind of intellect and
rigor and discipline and all that is curiosity.

266
00:13:51,004 --> 00:13:55,649
And so you have to be curious as to, okay, why
is this business the way it is?

267
00:13:55,649 --> 00:13:58,370
And why did they do that thing that turned out
to be not so good?

268
00:13:58,370 --> 00:13:59,889
And what is the reason that this happened?

269
00:13:59,889 --> 00:14:05,250
And and so just that desire to to just that
middling itch to go figure something out.

270
00:14:05,250 --> 00:14:06,289
Like, why is it this way?

271
00:14:06,289 --> 00:14:08,610
And and it might appear obvious, but maybe it's
not obvious.

272
00:14:08,610 --> 00:14:13,065
And I don't quite understand this, so I gotta
keep pressing because it's bugging me.

273
00:14:13,065 --> 00:14:15,225
People outside the industry or maybe new to the
industry will say, well, I'm looking for good

274
00:14:15,225 --> 00:14:17,004
businesses with bad balance sheets.

275
00:14:17,144 --> 00:14:17,305
Okay.

276
00:14:17,305 --> 00:14:18,024
That's a myth.

277
00:14:18,024 --> 00:14:22,425
Like, that debt was put there for a reason, and
it was it was it was incurred based on a set of

278
00:14:22,425 --> 00:14:24,570
representations and promises that weren't met.

279
00:14:24,809 --> 00:14:26,250
And so why did that happen?

280
00:14:26,250 --> 00:14:26,490
Right?

281
00:14:26,490 --> 00:14:28,110
Why was someone wrong here?

282
00:14:28,490 --> 00:14:33,370
It's too much debt just doesn't magically
appear on an otherwise good and stable and

283
00:14:33,370 --> 00:14:34,090
growing business.

284
00:14:34,090 --> 00:14:35,129
It's there for a reason.

285
00:14:35,129 --> 00:14:39,070
Understand why, and now you're on your path to
making a good debt investment.

286
00:14:39,475 --> 00:14:41,875
It's a mix of right brain and left brain
thinking.

287
00:14:41,875 --> 00:14:42,695
I think so.

288
00:14:43,154 --> 00:14:44,695
So talk about your portfolio.

289
00:14:44,835 --> 00:14:49,075
So how do you make sure that your portfolio is
diversified, and what factors go into your

290
00:14:49,075 --> 00:14:49,975
portfolio construction?

291
00:14:50,195 --> 00:14:53,095
We spend a good amount of time thinking about
portfolio construction.

292
00:14:53,950 --> 00:14:57,809
And so diversification is famously the free
lunch in portfolio construction.

293
00:14:57,870 --> 00:15:00,190
We we avail ourselves of it as everyone else
does.

294
00:15:00,190 --> 00:15:05,470
We have 40 to 60 investments at any one time in
a fully ramped portfolio with an average

295
00:15:05,470 --> 00:15:12,274
position size of about 2%, with an upper bound
in the mid to high single digits, call it 7%,

296
00:15:12,274 --> 00:15:14,434
and very few of our investments even approach
that.

297
00:15:14,434 --> 00:15:14,835
And so

298
00:15:14,995 --> 00:15:18,115
No matter how bullish you are, you have that 7%
cap.

299
00:15:18,115 --> 00:15:18,615
Correct.

300
00:15:18,675 --> 00:15:18,995
Correct.

301
00:15:18,995 --> 00:15:22,320
And you're just never gonna see us, exceed it.

302
00:15:22,480 --> 00:15:25,460
Even if I wanted to, others in the firm would
stop me, and I don't want to.

303
00:15:25,839 --> 00:15:29,860
We have pretty tight risk controls, and we
really prize diversification, and we'd never

304
00:15:30,399 --> 00:15:32,339
never ever move away from it.

305
00:15:32,399 --> 00:15:33,440
So that's table stakes.

306
00:15:33,440 --> 00:15:34,159
That's easy.

307
00:15:34,159 --> 00:15:37,955
We industry we diversify by company I just
described by industry.

308
00:15:37,955 --> 00:15:44,034
What's maybe not as obvious, but I think
important and especially in our asset class is

309
00:15:44,034 --> 00:15:46,134
diversification by causal factor.

310
00:15:46,914 --> 00:15:48,934
And so maybe I'll by example.

311
00:15:49,539 --> 00:15:54,419
In 02/2015 '16, in the energy sector, the oil
patch in The US rolled over.

312
00:15:54,419 --> 00:15:59,240
Supply demand imbalance, energy prices fell,
profitability of energy related firms fell,

313
00:15:59,460 --> 00:16:01,220
sponsors have been very active in that.

314
00:16:01,220 --> 00:16:05,294
Energy is a good place to borrow money, and
have been a good place to lend money for a long

315
00:16:05,294 --> 00:16:05,794
time.

316
00:16:06,014 --> 00:16:11,695
And so in 02/2016 in particular, the the the
addressable universe of distressed and

317
00:16:11,695 --> 00:16:14,595
opportunities was disproportionately weighted
towards energy.

318
00:16:15,054 --> 00:16:19,429
And so when you look at energy companies, they
fall into broadly four buckets.

319
00:16:19,490 --> 00:16:22,789
You've got upstream, which is natural
resources, stuff in the ground.

320
00:16:23,009 --> 00:16:25,669
You've got downstream, which is refining and
pipelines.

321
00:16:26,929 --> 00:16:30,529
You've got service businesses, that can be
fracking businesses.

322
00:16:30,529 --> 00:16:31,649
It can be water businesses.

323
00:16:31,649 --> 00:16:36,164
It could be staffing businesses that help
support both the construction of wells and then

324
00:16:36,164 --> 00:16:38,065
the getting the product out of the ground.

325
00:16:38,204 --> 00:16:42,284
And then you've got manufacturing businesses
where perhaps a disproportionate of their end

326
00:16:42,284 --> 00:16:43,664
markets are energy related.

327
00:16:44,044 --> 00:16:49,070
And so in 02/2016, you've got four different,
quote, unquote, industries there.

328
00:16:49,289 --> 00:16:55,289
Well, if you made six to eight investments in
each of those four industries amongst companies

329
00:16:55,289 --> 00:16:59,049
that were active in that space and distressed
at that time, you would say, okay.

330
00:16:59,049 --> 00:17:03,304
I've got 24 companies, and they're diversified
across four different industries.

331
00:17:03,304 --> 00:17:04,984
That's a pretty diversified portfolio.

332
00:17:04,984 --> 00:17:06,605
I feel decent about my risk.

333
00:17:07,384 --> 00:17:10,984
And then if natural gas went to a dollar, every
single one of those companies would be in

334
00:17:10,984 --> 00:17:11,384
trouble.

335
00:17:11,384 --> 00:17:15,680
And you'd find out that while you had, you
know, on paper diversification, you had a

336
00:17:15,680 --> 00:17:21,119
concentration of a % to this one causal factor,
which is the price of the natural resource and

337
00:17:21,119 --> 00:17:26,099
a correlation of risk in your portfolio, that
you really are unhappy about at that point.

338
00:17:26,319 --> 00:17:29,654
And so that's something that we look at pretty
closely and try to make sure.

339
00:17:29,654 --> 00:17:33,914
The reason it's important for our asset class
is because it's something I touched on earlier

340
00:17:34,055 --> 00:17:36,955
where the stress tends to rotate from sector to
sector.

341
00:17:37,095 --> 00:17:42,134
And so if you're deploying capital outside of a
credit crisis, maybe two or three industries

342
00:17:42,134 --> 00:17:46,529
are having a hard time at any given moment
because some macroeconomic factor is out of

343
00:17:46,529 --> 00:17:48,390
whack or something else happened.

344
00:17:48,609 --> 00:17:54,849
And so because of that dynamic, it's easy to
find that causal factor concentration because

345
00:17:54,849 --> 00:17:58,054
that's what caused these companies to become
distressed in the first place.

346
00:17:58,194 --> 00:18:00,674
And so you have to work pretty hard to avoid
it.

347
00:18:00,674 --> 00:18:05,634
And so that's something that we really spent
some time thinking about, and making sure we

348
00:18:05,634 --> 00:18:07,154
don't have access exposure to.

349
00:18:07,154 --> 00:18:09,119
You know, energy prices is an easy one.

350
00:18:09,200 --> 00:18:14,400
Interest rates is maybe even an easier one, but
things like wage inflation, are a little more

351
00:18:14,400 --> 00:18:18,079
pernicious, home building rates, mortgage
rates, what have you.

352
00:18:18,319 --> 00:18:20,799
There's a number that cut across where you say,
okay.

353
00:18:20,799 --> 00:18:24,900
I don't want too much exposure to that dynamic,
to that causal factor.

354
00:18:25,585 --> 00:18:28,544
What's interesting about that, a lot of people
don't even track that causal factor.

355
00:18:28,544 --> 00:18:32,644
It's not only important intuitively, it seems
like even more important than geographical

356
00:18:32,865 --> 00:18:33,365
concentration.

357
00:18:33,744 --> 00:18:37,524
If you have a widget factory in Ohio and you
also have a coal mine, that doesn't necessarily

358
00:18:37,585 --> 00:18:41,599
mean that you're not diversified if it's
completely different industries or if you have

359
00:18:41,599 --> 00:18:42,880
companies of the same stage.

360
00:18:42,880 --> 00:18:44,400
Also, it doesn't mean that you're not
diversified.

361
00:18:44,400 --> 00:18:45,779
They could be completely uncorrelated.

362
00:18:46,240 --> 00:18:46,799
Exactly right.

363
00:18:46,799 --> 00:18:51,440
If if if you're looking at a population of
companies that are providing a broad variety of

364
00:18:51,440 --> 00:18:56,785
services to cash flow negative VC funded
emerging tech companies, and there happens to

365
00:18:56,785 --> 00:19:00,384
be a chill in the air when it comes to VC
funding, you're gonna find out you've got a lot

366
00:19:00,384 --> 00:19:02,884
more correlation in your portfolio than you
first suspected.

367
00:19:03,744 --> 00:19:07,940
What do you wish you knew before starting
sixteen years ago at HIG?

368
00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:11,460
The financial services industry is evolving
rapidly.

369
00:19:11,839 --> 00:19:16,640
Reed Smith's team of over 200 financial
industry group lawyers helps clients navigate

370
00:19:16,640 --> 00:19:22,424
the complexities of the sector in an era marked
by technological advancements and AI.

371
00:19:22,424 --> 00:19:26,505
Reed Smith's lawyers have a deep understanding
of market dynamics, legal frameworks, and

372
00:19:26,505 --> 00:19:31,304
regulatory developments, and advise financial
institutions and technology companies on

373
00:19:31,304 --> 00:19:36,125
financing, lending, investment management,
restructuring, insolvency, and litigation.

374
00:19:38,159 --> 00:19:41,460
I'm not sure that I didn't know it, but I
probably believe it more strongly now.

375
00:19:41,679 --> 00:19:45,460
Just a laser like focus on the quality of the
business.

376
00:19:45,519 --> 00:19:50,640
I probably attach more importance to the
quality and stability of a management team than

377
00:19:50,640 --> 00:19:53,414
I did sixteen years ago when evaluating a
company.

378
00:19:53,414 --> 00:19:55,894
I've I've just found that that's an important
factor.

379
00:19:55,894 --> 00:20:00,775
There's no line for it in your spreadsheet, in
your financial model, but it's it's something

380
00:20:00,775 --> 00:20:05,095
that and so if you're looking at a distressed
company, one of the first questions I'm gonna

381
00:20:05,095 --> 00:20:08,555
ask is, what's been the recent turnover in the
management team?

382
00:20:08,690 --> 00:20:12,210
And if the CEO has exited in the last four
months, that business isn't doing well.

383
00:20:12,210 --> 00:20:13,569
I I don't care what's going on.

384
00:20:13,569 --> 00:20:17,890
You don't swap out your CEO unless you're in
somewhat desperate straits.

385
00:20:17,890 --> 00:20:19,730
That's an incredibly disruptive move.

386
00:20:19,730 --> 00:20:23,585
It puts you back on your timeline as a private
equity sponsor at least twelve to eighteen

387
00:20:23,585 --> 00:20:24,884
months, if not longer.

388
00:20:25,105 --> 00:20:28,325
It's something you do when you absolutely have
to, not if you want to.

389
00:20:28,384 --> 00:20:34,304
And so if you see a company that's undergoing
CEO or CFO turnover, you need to be fairly

390
00:20:34,304 --> 00:20:36,690
cautious in approaching that because things are
not good.

391
00:20:36,929 --> 00:20:41,329
And so that's a factor I probably didn't give
enough weight to earlier in my career that I

392
00:20:41,329 --> 00:20:43,509
that I I pay more attention to now.

393
00:20:43,569 --> 00:20:46,789
And really just a laser like focus on the
fundamentals.

394
00:20:46,849 --> 00:20:48,149
What are the unit economics?

395
00:20:48,210 --> 00:20:49,329
What's going on in the industry?

396
00:20:49,329 --> 00:20:50,690
What is the competitive position?

397
00:20:50,690 --> 00:20:52,069
What is the capital efficiency?

398
00:20:52,369 --> 00:20:58,164
I In some of the basics that everyone kind of,
espouses, but they're very, very important.

399
00:20:58,545 --> 00:21:02,065
What's something that you thought was important
sixteen years ago that's not that important

400
00:21:02,065 --> 00:21:02,565
today?

401
00:21:02,625 --> 00:21:07,105
Some of the the the the tricks and traps of the
bankruptcy process, if you're a a clever

402
00:21:07,105 --> 00:21:11,720
distressed investor, you can you can do some
neat kinda clever maneuvers inside of

403
00:21:11,720 --> 00:21:16,839
bankruptcy court to maybe position your debt a
little more, favorably or or try to squeeze out

404
00:21:16,839 --> 00:21:21,080
some other holders or slip a term in there or
or apply some capital at just the right moment

405
00:21:21,080 --> 00:21:22,059
to create an edge.

406
00:21:22,444 --> 00:21:23,724
And and and that feels good.

407
00:21:23,724 --> 00:21:27,105
It feels like you won there or you figured
something out that other people can't.

408
00:21:27,724 --> 00:21:32,144
But what I've learned over time is the
cleverness and the maneuvering in bankruptcy,

409
00:21:33,005 --> 00:21:37,319
in some cases is just rearranging deck chairs
on the Titanic, and the most important thing is

410
00:21:37,319 --> 00:21:39,259
that the business either has value or it
doesn't.

411
00:21:39,480 --> 00:21:43,880
And the cute little thing you did in bankruptcy
or the, you know, the the equipment pool claim

412
00:21:43,880 --> 00:21:48,380
that you picked up from insurance company at a
really attractive price, it's not important.

413
00:21:48,519 --> 00:21:52,974
What is important is this business is doing
well, and it's on a stable footing to emerge in

414
00:21:52,974 --> 00:21:56,115
bankruptcy and and grow in the future or it's
not.

415
00:21:56,494 --> 00:21:58,835
Get that part right, and you're gonna be fairly
happy.

416
00:21:58,974 --> 00:22:02,015
Get that part wrong, and it doesn't really
matter what you do in court.

417
00:22:02,015 --> 00:22:02,815
Man, I'm really curious.

418
00:22:02,815 --> 00:22:07,150
Over sixteen years, you're not only working on
deals, you're building a competency of working

419
00:22:07,150 --> 00:22:07,710
on deals.

420
00:22:07,710 --> 00:22:09,890
You're building your edge in the marketplace.

421
00:22:10,029 --> 00:22:14,750
What has compounded for you in sixteen years,
and what is basically just continuously start

422
00:22:14,750 --> 00:22:17,144
from zero every single time that you do it?

423
00:22:17,384 --> 00:22:18,424
Compounding is twofold.

424
00:22:18,424 --> 00:22:19,884
Relationships is number one.

425
00:22:20,585 --> 00:22:25,144
And so we've got a handful of restructuring
attorneys that, you know, some of whom I've

426
00:22:25,144 --> 00:22:26,924
worked with for over twenty years now.

427
00:22:27,144 --> 00:22:32,500
And so when we start on a new endeavor
together, we're already on second base.

428
00:22:32,500 --> 00:22:32,740
Right?

429
00:22:32,740 --> 00:22:36,340
I've got enough history with this individual,
and they have enough history with me that

430
00:22:36,340 --> 00:22:38,200
there's a lot of things that almost go
unspoken.

431
00:22:38,259 --> 00:22:41,859
We know right away how we're gonna approach
this, what we're gonna do, what we're not gonna

432
00:22:41,859 --> 00:22:42,259
do.

433
00:22:42,259 --> 00:22:46,825
If we're faced with a decision how we're gonna
handle it, how are we gonna treat, other

434
00:22:46,825 --> 00:22:50,125
stakeholders who maybe wanna work with us and
cooperate or not.

435
00:22:50,664 --> 00:22:52,444
So that's been something that's compounded.

436
00:22:52,984 --> 00:22:57,869
Another thing that's compounded and and really,
we've piggybacked off the growth of the firm.

437
00:22:58,029 --> 00:23:03,009
There's real scale benefits to, being part of a
larger alternatives firm.

438
00:23:03,230 --> 00:23:09,230
We just have access to a much deeper and wider
information net, you know, dataset than we

439
00:23:09,230 --> 00:23:10,450
would if we were independent.

440
00:23:10,509 --> 00:23:13,974
And so as the firm has grown, that advantage
has grown.

441
00:23:13,974 --> 00:23:15,434
So that's something that's scaled.

442
00:23:15,575 --> 00:23:19,174
We are getting better and better every year at
taking full advantage of it.

443
00:23:19,174 --> 00:23:23,494
We're a pretty networked firm and a very
collaborative firm, but we're also a big firm.

444
00:23:23,494 --> 00:23:28,490
And so getting to every single person who knows
every single thing that you wanna know can

445
00:23:28,490 --> 00:23:31,549
sometimes be a challenge, and we're getting
better at that.

446
00:23:31,609 --> 00:23:33,789
So those are two things I'd say that have
scaled.

447
00:23:33,849 --> 00:23:35,710
One thing that hasn't scaled is sourcing.

448
00:23:35,930 --> 00:23:40,089
I mean, every going and finding deals, you
know, every day is a new day, every day is a

449
00:23:40,089 --> 00:23:40,750
new challenge.

450
00:23:41,744 --> 00:23:45,585
Finding deals is is frankly not that hard in
our space.

451
00:23:45,585 --> 00:23:48,484
Finding good deals and good value, really is.

452
00:23:48,545 --> 00:23:52,545
What would you like our audience to know about
you, about HIG, or anything else you'd like to

453
00:23:52,545 --> 00:23:52,865
share?

454
00:23:52,865 --> 00:23:57,819
I think we have a pretty distinct identity as
one of, if not the preeminent alternatives

455
00:23:58,200 --> 00:24:00,220
firms in the small mid cap space.

456
00:24:00,839 --> 00:24:04,759
We've got a long standing culture of value
orientation and cash flow centric investing.

457
00:24:04,759 --> 00:24:09,419
We we gravitate towards complexity that goes
hand in hand with being a value investor.

458
00:24:10,515 --> 00:24:12,914
And we have a pretty distinct approach and
culture.

459
00:24:12,914 --> 00:24:16,355
At the end of twenty twenty three, and we got a
large number of our LPs together.

460
00:24:16,355 --> 00:24:17,234
It's very well attended.

461
00:24:17,234 --> 00:24:18,994
It was a great event, a lot of fun.

462
00:24:18,994 --> 00:24:22,755
And at that, each strategy presented to our
LPs.

463
00:24:22,755 --> 00:24:23,795
You know, here's who we are.

464
00:24:23,795 --> 00:24:24,934
Here's what we're doing.

465
00:24:25,610 --> 00:24:28,970
Here's what's going on in our market, and here
are some representative transactions to give

466
00:24:28,970 --> 00:24:29,529
you a flavor.

467
00:24:29,529 --> 00:24:32,509
And then we had a number of our portfolio
companies come present as well.

468
00:24:32,730 --> 00:24:37,309
And it was very well received by our investors,
but we did get a piece of constructive

469
00:24:37,369 --> 00:24:42,674
criticism, which is as each strategy presented,
they kept saying the same thing over and over

470
00:24:42,674 --> 00:24:46,434
again in terms of how they approached
investing, what they gravitated towards, small

471
00:24:46,434 --> 00:24:49,734
and mid cap, value oriented, cash flow centric,
seek out complexity.

472
00:24:50,194 --> 00:24:53,210
And by the end of the second day is the LPs
like, guys, time out.

473
00:24:53,210 --> 00:24:53,769
We got it.

474
00:24:53,769 --> 00:24:57,930
Like, you don't need to say this for the
twelfth time, and and it wasn't something that

475
00:24:57,930 --> 00:25:01,130
we did, with forethought.

476
00:25:01,130 --> 00:25:06,269
It's just a natural result of each funded
strategy putting together its own presentation

477
00:25:06,755 --> 00:25:11,475
and having this commonality of approach and
culture across strategies and geographies that

478
00:25:11,475 --> 00:25:13,955
made it a little more redundant than maybe we
wanted to.

479
00:25:13,955 --> 00:25:18,674
So it was kinda funny, but, also, it was a
little affirming that as the firm has grown,

480
00:25:18,674 --> 00:25:20,934
we've been able to keep that culture pretty
constant.

481
00:25:21,359 --> 00:25:25,140
Said another way, the opposite of small is
large and efficient.

482
00:25:25,519 --> 00:25:30,180
The opposite of value is growth, which, you
know, if you go back hundred years, value

483
00:25:30,319 --> 00:25:31,440
values outperform growth.

484
00:25:31,440 --> 00:25:33,920
The opposite of complexity is commoditized
trade.

485
00:25:33,920 --> 00:25:37,615
So it makes sense why these are sustainable
sources of competitive advantage.

486
00:25:37,615 --> 00:25:42,095
Well, Jackson, look forward to continuing the
conversation live, sitting down Boston or New

487
00:25:42,095 --> 00:25:43,214
York very, very soon.

488
00:25:43,214 --> 00:25:43,855
Thanks, David.

489
00:25:43,855 --> 00:25:44,538
Appreciate it.

490
00:25:45,338 --> 00:25:46,298
Thanks for listening.

491
00:25:46,298 --> 00:25:49,018
If you enjoy this episode, please share it with
a friend.

492
00:25:49,018 --> 00:25:52,798
This helps us grow and also provides the best
feedback when we review the episode's

493
00:25:52,858 --> 00:25:53,358
analytics.

494
00:25:53,738 --> 00:25:54,958
Thank you for your support.