General MacArthur’s War Path with Walter Borneman

1
00:00:04,040 --> 00:00:07,840
Welcome to AMSEcast, coming to you from Oak Ridge, Tennessee,

2
00:00:08,179 --> 00:00:11,500
a global leader in science, technology, and innovation.

3
00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:15,309
My name is Alan Lowe, director of the American Museum

4
00:00:15,339 --> 00:00:18,710
of Science and Energy, and the K-25 History Center.

5
00:00:19,710 --> 00:00:23,080
Each episode of AMSEcast presents world-renowned authors,

6
00:00:23,529 --> 00:00:27,480
scientists, historians, policymakers, and everyone in between,

7
00:00:27,929 --> 00:00:31,099
sharing their insights on a variety of fascinating topics.

8
00:00:35,379 --> 00:00:36,689
Welcome to AMSEcast.

9
00:00:37,029 --> 00:00:40,140
I’m very pleased to welcome, on this episode, Walter Borneman.

10
00:00:40,720 --> 00:00:43,430
Walt received degrees in history from Western State College

11
00:00:43,430 --> 00:00:46,580
of Colorado, and his law degree from the University of Denver.

12
00:00:47,090 --> 00:00:51,664
He’s become an award-winning author of books like The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey,

13
00:00:51,839 --> 00:00:57,220
Leahy, and King, Polk: The Man Who Transformed the Presidency and America, and

14
00:00:57,220 --> 00:01:02,360
the book we’ll discuss today, MacArthur at War: World War II in the Pacific.

15
00:01:02,800 --> 00:01:04,039
Walt, it’s so good to see you again.

16
00:01:04,039 --> 00:01:05,210
Welcome to AMSEcast.

17
00:01:05,700 --> 00:01:06,899
Thanks for having me, Alan.

18
00:01:06,900 --> 00:01:07,600
Good to be here.

19
00:01:07,679 --> 00:01:10,510
Now, I have to tell our listeners, if anyone out there has a real desire

20
00:01:10,510 --> 00:01:13,790
to learn more about James K. Polk, we spoke on the podcast I produced

21
00:01:13,800 --> 00:01:17,780
separately, American POTUS, about Polk, an amazing personality, in our

22
00:01:17,780 --> 00:01:22,009
history, amazingly important personality, kind of like Douglas MacArthur.

23
00:01:22,420 --> 00:01:25,050
So, let’s turn to Mr. MacArthur, shall we?

24
00:01:25,110 --> 00:01:28,610
He had a long, accomplished career before World War II,

25
00:01:28,850 --> 00:01:31,210
and I know, again, I’m skipping over a lot of things.

26
00:01:31,210 --> 00:01:34,580
He was commandant of West Point, he was Army Chief of

27
00:01:34,580 --> 00:01:38,090
Staff, all these things, building up an amazing resume.

28
00:01:38,460 --> 00:01:41,660
Why, then did he leave in 1936 to assume the role

29
00:01:41,660 --> 00:01:44,579
of Field Marshal in the army of the Philippines, and

30
00:01:44,580 --> 00:01:46,979
military to the advisor of the president of that country?

31
00:01:47,809 --> 00:01:50,910
Well, I think not to be flip, but I think he was

32
00:01:50,910 --> 00:01:53,980
bored, or at least he knew he was going to be bored.

33
00:01:54,290 --> 00:01:57,030
To fill in a few of those details, MacArthur is

34
00:01:57,030 --> 00:02:00,619
born in 1880, he graduates from West Point in 1903.

35
00:02:01,370 --> 00:02:04,869
To your point, he goes on, and he’s been commandant of West

36
00:02:04,869 --> 00:02:10,060
Point, and Herbert Hoover in 1930 appoints him chief of staff.

37
00:02:10,840 --> 00:02:16,209
It’s a four year term, and then Franklin Roosevelt gives him another year.

38
00:02:16,440 --> 00:02:19,820
So, it’s 1935 and he’s only 55 years old.

39
00:02:19,830 --> 00:02:21,270
He’s sort of done everything.

40
00:02:21,679 --> 00:02:26,519
And remember that at this point, the Philippines are an American territory.

41
00:02:26,900 --> 00:02:32,040
I think what he really wants to be is high commissioner to the Philippines.

42
00:02:32,440 --> 00:02:36,840
That may not sound like a very big deal today, but in that era,

43
00:02:36,849 --> 00:02:40,620
William Howard Taft, former president, has been high commissioner

44
00:02:40,620 --> 00:02:44,350
to the Philippines, and it’s a pretty high-profile role.

45
00:02:44,870 --> 00:02:49,590
But if he were going to take that, he’d have to resign from the army, and

46
00:02:49,590 --> 00:02:53,170
that’s [laugh] not something that Douglas MacArthur would willingly do.

47
00:02:54,139 --> 00:02:59,529
So, this idea that he will go as a military advisor to the Philippines and

48
00:02:59,529 --> 00:03:05,540
then become a Field Marshal in the Filipino army, this is really a part of

49
00:03:05,540 --> 00:03:10,320
a transition to get that American territory on the road to independence.

50
00:03:10,469 --> 00:03:13,310
And this is all happening in the late-1930s.

51
00:03:13,549 --> 00:03:13,990
I see.

52
00:03:14,139 --> 00:03:17,659
And again skipping over this part, but I was amazed, in his early

53
00:03:17,660 --> 00:03:21,730
life, the really important role that his mother played in his career.

54
00:03:21,740 --> 00:03:23,500
I mean, she was there for him every step of the

55
00:03:23,500 --> 00:03:25,580
way, making sure he made those advancements.

56
00:03:26,380 --> 00:03:29,920
His mother actually goes with him to West Point,

57
00:03:30,139 --> 00:03:33,230
if you will, and takes up residence there.

58
00:03:33,290 --> 00:03:34,860
And it’s kind of interesting.

59
00:03:34,869 --> 00:03:39,149
The only other major figure that we’re going to mention today and talk about

60
00:03:39,410 --> 00:03:44,440
whose mother is similar to what today we might call a helicopter parent is

61
00:03:44,440 --> 00:03:48,049
Sarah Roosevelt, who does almost the same thing with Franklin at Harvard.

62
00:03:48,139 --> 00:03:48,940
That’s very true.

63
00:03:48,940 --> 00:03:49,709
Very true.

64
00:03:50,179 --> 00:03:52,969
So, before the war commenced—our war commenced—with

65
00:03:52,969 --> 00:03:56,400
Japan in 1941, MacArthur’s in the Philippines.

66
00:03:56,670 --> 00:03:59,690
What were his plans for defending the Philippines, and how did

67
00:03:59,690 --> 00:04:02,650
those mesh with the overall American strategy in the Pacific.

68
00:04:03,090 --> 00:04:06,660
I think there’s always a general aspect of

69
00:04:06,670 --> 00:04:10,410
fighting the last war in any type of military.

70
00:04:10,750 --> 00:04:15,470
And for decades, the American military has sort of thought back to

71
00:04:15,480 --> 00:04:20,469
1898 and the Spanish American War, where Admiral Dewey has gone and

72
00:04:20,470 --> 00:04:25,299
captured the Philippines and attacked Manila, and this idea that there’s

73
00:04:25,320 --> 00:04:30,350
going to be a drive across the Pacific to oppose Japan, or anyone

74
00:04:30,360 --> 00:04:35,599
else for that matter, is ingrained in the American military psyche.

75
00:04:36,090 --> 00:04:41,370
But slowly but surely, there’s a thought that the American military is going

76
00:04:41,370 --> 00:04:47,130
to really hunker down around Manila and try to hold that on as a strong point.

77
00:04:47,400 --> 00:04:52,920
Now, Douglas MacArthur says that he can defend the entire archipelago.

78
00:04:54,340 --> 00:05:01,639
And the core of that is his plan for a 200,000 man and Filipino army.

79
00:05:01,840 --> 00:05:05,249
And that’s supposed to be the defense, mostly

80
00:05:05,250 --> 00:05:08,539
trained and certainly commanded by American troops.

81
00:05:08,560 --> 00:05:11,000
And there are definitely—because, again, it’s American

82
00:05:11,000 --> 00:05:15,039
territory—there are definitely American troops in the Philippines.

83
00:05:15,320 --> 00:05:17,010
But that’s MacArthur’s plan.

84
00:05:17,290 --> 00:05:22,740
It never really comes to fruition because it’s just tough to train and

85
00:05:22,740 --> 00:05:28,099
keep trained that number of men, and again, spread out across the islands.

86
00:05:28,740 --> 00:05:31,920
When that attack occurs in the Philippines, how did

87
00:05:31,920 --> 00:05:35,820
President Roosevelt and General Marshall respond to it?

88
00:05:35,830 --> 00:05:40,209
And at the end of the day, we know MacArthur has to leave to go to Australia,

89
00:05:40,639 --> 00:05:43,330
but he later says, if I remember correctly, that he could have held Bataan.

90
00:05:43,330 --> 00:05:44,849
Is there any merit to that?

91
00:05:45,760 --> 00:05:50,250
Well, you know, I think there’s a tendency, certainly, one of the themes

92
00:05:50,250 --> 00:05:55,170
that MacArthur himself had is that he was always outnumbered, and that

93
00:05:55,200 --> 00:05:59,580
the United States, particularly Franklin Roosevelt and Chief of Staff

94
00:05:59,580 --> 00:06:03,900
Marshall, didn’t give him the adequate number of supplies and things.

95
00:06:04,290 --> 00:06:05,770
But it’s kind of interesting.

96
00:06:05,820 --> 00:06:10,400
I’m sure many of your listeners are familiar with the classic movie Tora!

97
00:06:10,480 --> 00:06:11,260
Tora!

98
00:06:11,260 --> 00:06:11,539
Tora!

99
00:06:11,820 --> 00:06:15,630
Those B-17 that fly into Pearl Harbor on that morning

100
00:06:15,630 --> 00:06:18,260
of December 7th, you know where they’re bound for?

101
00:06:18,299 --> 00:06:20,669
They’re bound for MacArthur in the Philippines.

102
00:06:21,050 --> 00:06:27,300
And in the time when American military strength is pretty minimal

103
00:06:27,330 --> 00:06:33,610
and spread pretty thin, MacArthur has actually gotten a number of

104
00:06:33,929 --> 00:06:39,050
airplanes, not only B-17s, but P-40s, he’s got a number of men.

105
00:06:39,400 --> 00:06:44,110
And in the big picture to the Pacific War, the Philippines is as

106
00:06:44,130 --> 00:06:48,489
heavily defended as anything else we have out there, west of Hawaii.

107
00:06:48,840 --> 00:06:55,690
Now, could he have held Bataan until a relief force came along?

108
00:06:55,960 --> 00:06:59,030
I think at the end of the day, the answer is probably

109
00:06:59,030 --> 00:07:03,920
no because he had simply failed to train and mobilize

110
00:07:03,950 --> 00:07:08,499
this 200,000 man Filipino army that he had in his plans.

111
00:07:08,950 --> 00:07:13,090
And they also were facing a very experienced Japanese juggernaut at that point.

112
00:07:13,710 --> 00:07:15,130
No question about that.

113
00:07:15,160 --> 00:07:18,849
And we’ll talk about island hopping a little bit, but you know,

114
00:07:19,090 --> 00:07:25,630
the Japanese military really surrounds Bataan, and they don’t stop.

115
00:07:26,030 --> 00:07:31,280
They keep rolling eastward, ultimately into the Solomons, and what we

116
00:07:31,280 --> 00:07:36,030
know is going to be a major fight in the summer of 1942 at Guadalcanal.

117
00:07:36,110 --> 00:07:40,419
So, when MacArthur gets to Australia, what is his overall role, then, in

118
00:07:40,630 --> 00:07:44,759
the Pacific Command in the war, and how did that role evolve over time?

119
00:07:45,030 --> 00:07:50,280
If you think of a map of the Pacific Ocean, MacArthur’s got

120
00:07:50,300 --> 00:07:54,680
this small little quadrant in the extreme lower left-hand

121
00:07:54,680 --> 00:07:59,270
corner, and it’s basically called the Southwest Pacific area.

122
00:07:59,750 --> 00:08:02,969
Now, he becomes commander-in-chief Southwest

123
00:08:02,969 --> 00:08:05,519
Pacific area, that’s his official title.

124
00:08:06,010 --> 00:08:10,310
It includes the Philippines, which, of course, by then, are occupied

125
00:08:10,320 --> 00:08:15,659
by Japan, New Guinea, where Japan is attacking, and Australia.

126
00:08:16,260 --> 00:08:22,240
Now, to the east of that line, there’s the South Pacific area, which is going to

127
00:08:22,240 --> 00:08:27,250
include the great battles around Guadalcanal and a fair chunk of the Solomons.

128
00:08:27,570 --> 00:08:31,440
It’s kind of interesting because that begs that MacArthur is going to

129
00:08:31,450 --> 00:08:37,089
have to work in cooperation with Nimitz and Halsey and the Navy, but

130
00:08:37,090 --> 00:08:42,399
it’s kind of interesting that the Joint Chiefs adjust that line because

131
00:08:42,400 --> 00:08:47,349
originally, the dividing line goes almost directly through Guadalcanal.

132
00:08:47,560 --> 00:08:51,560
The Joint Chiefs adjust that line westward so it’s really clear

133
00:08:51,560 --> 00:08:54,859
that the fighting around Guadalcanal is under the command of Nimitz

134
00:08:56,130 --> 00:09:00,519
and later Halsey, and principally a navy show, while MacArthur

135
00:09:00,800 --> 00:09:05,730
is relegated to this Southwest Pacific Area west of there.

136
00:09:05,880 --> 00:09:07,650
It seems like that relationship with the

137
00:09:07,650 --> 00:09:09,660
Navy was never an easy one for MacArthur.

138
00:09:10,290 --> 00:09:11,200
Is that correct?

139
00:09:11,440 --> 00:09:14,899
I think anecdotally—and Alan, I have to take a little bit of

140
00:09:14,900 --> 00:09:18,589
responsibility, maybe, myself because I have a chapter in my book

141
00:09:18,590 --> 00:09:23,699
The Admirals quote, “Fighting Japan and Macarthur,” close quotes.

142
00:09:23,900 --> 00:09:27,480
That may be a little bit of an overstatement.

143
00:09:27,599 --> 00:09:32,509
But I think at the broad strategic level, recognizing that MacArthur

144
00:09:32,509 --> 00:09:36,530
is always going to say that he never got enough men or materiel,

145
00:09:37,240 --> 00:09:42,760
there really was close cooperation, or at least close cooperation

146
00:09:42,760 --> 00:09:48,270
that developed over time between MacArthur and the two principal naval

147
00:09:48,270 --> 00:09:53,460
commanders of Halsey in the South Pacific and then Nimitz overall.

148
00:09:53,670 --> 00:09:57,560
I think where there was really some friction was at the staff level.

149
00:09:57,610 --> 00:10:03,270
And the major chief of staffs for each of these commanders and other operational

150
00:10:03,290 --> 00:10:09,559
commanders sometimes were a little bit more fractious, if you will, and a little

151
00:10:09,559 --> 00:10:14,900
bit more ready to wave their [laugh] own flag of their independent service.

152
00:10:15,190 --> 00:10:18,990
So, when he arrived in Australia, was there a real threat of

153
00:10:18,990 --> 00:10:22,130
invasion there from Japan, or was that a real possibility?

154
00:10:22,920 --> 00:10:26,649
I think at the time, there was more of a thought that

155
00:10:26,660 --> 00:10:32,060
Japan might invade Australia, particularly after the war.

156
00:10:32,060 --> 00:10:37,910
When more archives were made available, Japanese archives, I think it was always

157
00:10:37,940 --> 00:10:44,890
pretty clear that Japan wanted to strike across the northern border of the

158
00:10:44,890 --> 00:10:50,680
larger Australia continent there, New Guinea and into the Solomons, and really

159
00:10:50,690 --> 00:10:58,530
sever the United States-to-Australia lifeline, and in doing so, kind of leave

160
00:10:58,530 --> 00:11:03,230
it as an apple that was going to—the continent of Australia—an apple that was

161
00:11:03,230 --> 00:11:08,410
going to drop from a tree, as opposed to really trying to invade Australia.

162
00:11:08,410 --> 00:11:12,420
It would have taken a huge number of troops that even

163
00:11:12,420 --> 00:11:16,170
Japan wasn’t going to be able to mass at that point.

164
00:11:16,170 --> 00:11:18,939
Remember, Australia is just a huge continent.

165
00:11:19,240 --> 00:11:20,719
You mentioned New Guinea a couple of times.

166
00:11:20,719 --> 00:11:24,319
I think probably an area not a lot of people are necessarily familiar with.

167
00:11:24,690 --> 00:11:29,070
Why was that area in and around New Guinea so vital to the Allied war plans?

168
00:11:29,830 --> 00:11:34,740
Well, first and foremost, it’s really the defensive perimeter to Australia.

169
00:11:35,160 --> 00:11:41,310
Think of it as really a chain of islands across the northern part of Australia.

170
00:11:41,440 --> 00:11:45,589
Secondly, it’s certainly the key Japanese route

171
00:11:45,770 --> 00:11:49,280
to the Solomons and continuing to strike eastward.

172
00:11:50,220 --> 00:11:54,870
I think the final point is that it really is

173
00:11:54,929 --> 00:11:57,960
the route back to the Philippines for MacArthur.

174
00:11:58,920 --> 00:12:03,490
I mean, say what you want about Douglas MacArthur, there is one theme:

175
00:12:03,510 --> 00:12:08,920
“I shall return.” And he meant that individually and everything that he

176
00:12:08,920 --> 00:12:15,110
does is really occasioned on his goal of returning to the Philippines.

177
00:12:15,320 --> 00:12:19,830
And that certainly led through New Guinea and those islands

178
00:12:19,870 --> 00:12:24,120
immediately to the west of New Guinea, in the Netherlands East Indies.

179
00:12:24,630 --> 00:12:28,490
My stepdad, Harry [Ottie] , was one of those island hopping

180
00:12:28,490 --> 00:12:30,970
in World War II, and occasionally he would speak of it.

181
00:12:31,040 --> 00:12:34,539
And he mentioned he once saw Douglas MacArthur, an important moment.

182
00:12:34,549 --> 00:12:37,689
He said, MacArthur looked very spick and span compared

183
00:12:37,690 --> 00:12:39,630
to the folks who have been [laugh] island hopping.

184
00:12:39,940 --> 00:12:43,270
But what was MacArthur’s role in formulating

185
00:12:43,290 --> 00:12:46,339
and then implementing that island hopping plan?

186
00:12:47,059 --> 00:12:52,400
Well, island hopping, which essentially was bypassing strong points,

187
00:12:52,490 --> 00:12:57,670
okay—I think Douglas MacArthur is a great implementer of that.

188
00:12:58,030 --> 00:13:04,030
It’s not fair to say that he was the originator of island hopping because,

189
00:13:04,059 --> 00:13:08,799
as we mentioned earlier, in some respects, the Japanese already did that

190
00:13:09,130 --> 00:13:14,600
with bypassing Bataan and Corregidor, strong points in the Philippines.

191
00:13:15,030 --> 00:13:20,040
Now, the Americans, remember, actually do a little island hopping of

192
00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:25,489
their own in 1943 in the Aleutians, where they bypass the Japanese

193
00:13:25,500 --> 00:13:29,740
held—sometimes we don’t remember that Japan actually invaded Alaska

194
00:13:29,779 --> 00:13:35,120
in 1942, and in taking those islands back, we bypassed the strong

195
00:13:35,120 --> 00:13:38,569
point of Kiska and attacked another island farther out, at Attu.

196
00:13:39,849 --> 00:13:42,859
Halsey has certainly done this in the Solomons too.

197
00:13:43,360 --> 00:13:48,049
And the first big, major Japanese strong point

198
00:13:48,139 --> 00:13:52,570
at Rabaul, Halsey wants to basically bypass that.

199
00:13:52,870 --> 00:13:56,170
MacArthur is pretty skeptical of that at that point.

200
00:13:56,480 --> 00:14:00,719
Well, the end result is that they do bypass Rabaul, and once

201
00:14:01,389 --> 00:14:05,020
MacArthur kind of gets into that, it takes him a little bit of time,

202
00:14:05,230 --> 00:14:09,120
but he’s going to implement it very effectively with his leaps to

203
00:14:09,120 --> 00:14:13,140
Hollandia and other points along the north coast of New Guinea.

204
00:14:13,430 --> 00:14:15,300
So, he’s a great implementer of it.

205
00:14:15,599 --> 00:14:20,160
And I guess I would just add, in that implementation, even though

206
00:14:20,160 --> 00:14:25,150
he’s not the originator of it, where I would give MacArthur credit is

207
00:14:25,150 --> 00:14:32,430
combined operations and the ability to put great commanders in charge

208
00:14:32,480 --> 00:14:38,239
of his Air, Navy, and land operations, and have them work together.

209
00:14:38,450 --> 00:14:41,909
And in some respects, it’s dictated by the geography,

210
00:14:41,910 --> 00:14:44,610
the vastness, the distance and everything else.

211
00:14:45,010 --> 00:14:48,710
But again, I refer back to MacArthur being

212
00:14:48,930 --> 00:14:53,250
a 19th century man in the old army school.

213
00:14:53,639 --> 00:14:58,870
This is kind of a new thing for him, and to his credit, I think,

214
00:14:58,990 --> 00:15:03,330
he adapts to this idea of combined operations, and certainly

215
00:15:03,340 --> 00:15:06,960
that’s a key part of being able to implement island hopping.

216
00:15:07,420 --> 00:15:10,810
And those combined operations do lead to successes, as

217
00:15:10,810 --> 00:15:14,109
you said, and we arrive at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

218
00:15:14,469 --> 00:15:16,669
And you say that, quote, “May have been the greatest

219
00:15:16,680 --> 00:15:19,709
victory ever won by the United States Navy,” unquote.

220
00:15:19,780 --> 00:15:20,800
Why do you say that?

221
00:15:21,750 --> 00:15:24,410
Well, maybe I could go back and eliminate the

222
00:15:24,410 --> 00:15:28,290
word ‘maybe,’ and simply call it that it is.

223
00:15:28,630 --> 00:15:33,400
But I think I wrote that originally because arguably, in World War

224
00:15:33,420 --> 00:15:36,619
II, at least, there might have been other turning-point battles,

225
00:15:36,619 --> 00:15:41,410
certainly very specifically, the Battle of Midway in June of 1942

226
00:15:42,030 --> 00:15:46,640
which blunts the Japanese attack across the Pacific toward Hawaii.

227
00:15:47,020 --> 00:15:51,480
And you know, sometimes we overlook the Battle of the Atlantic.

228
00:15:51,750 --> 00:15:58,160
This multi-year campaign against German U-boats, that had it not been won

229
00:15:58,690 --> 00:16:03,810
because of a convoy system because of anti-submarine warfare, you know,

230
00:16:03,810 --> 00:16:08,790
it’s arguably that we may not have been able to stockpile all of the men

231
00:16:08,790 --> 00:16:14,950
and materiel in Great Britain to afford the Normandy invasions in 1944.

232
00:16:15,250 --> 00:16:18,979
So, specifically about the Battle of Leyte

233
00:16:18,990 --> 00:16:22,640
Gulf, there’s really four major sea battles.

234
00:16:22,940 --> 00:16:25,080
And you know, it involves battleships.

235
00:16:25,090 --> 00:16:28,089
It involves—that’s the kind of the old thing—it

236
00:16:28,090 --> 00:16:31,170
involves aircraft carriers, certainly the new thing.

237
00:16:31,470 --> 00:16:35,250
And I guess the reason why I would stand by the greatest

238
00:16:35,250 --> 00:16:39,720
victory ever won is that afterwards, the Imperial

239
00:16:39,720 --> 00:16:44,820
Japanese Navy really ceases to exist as a fighting force.

240
00:16:44,980 --> 00:16:49,875
And you know, just a comment, Alan, about America’s industrial might.

241
00:16:50,210 --> 00:16:53,660
The idea that we have these relatively aging battleships

242
00:16:54,520 --> 00:16:59,170
destroyed at Pearl Harbor, and some of the early amphibious

243
00:16:59,170 --> 00:17:03,240
operations that MacArthur does are really done with just a

244
00:17:03,240 --> 00:17:07,469
couple of destroyers and landing craft, really a shoestring.

245
00:17:07,900 --> 00:17:15,359
By the time that Leyte Gulf comes along in the fall of 1944 and MacArthur

246
00:17:15,359 --> 00:17:21,899
himself is invading Leyte and en route to recapturing all of the Philippines

247
00:17:21,929 --> 00:17:27,540
and Manila, there’s this huge concentration of American military strength.

248
00:17:27,900 --> 00:17:31,640
And I think it’s a testament to America’s industrial

249
00:17:31,640 --> 00:17:35,730
power and the ability to launch all kinds of ships, big

250
00:17:35,730 --> 00:17:39,329
aircraft carriers, escort carriers, and everything else.

251
00:17:39,549 --> 00:17:43,510
Truly an amazing production that we revved up really quickly.

252
00:17:43,860 --> 00:17:45,550
They say, “They have awakened a sleeping giant,”

253
00:17:45,550 --> 00:17:48,010
and they certainly did, and evidence there.

254
00:17:48,220 --> 00:17:51,530
As they move closer and closer to the Japanese home islands,

255
00:17:51,830 --> 00:17:54,070
we know that plans are being drawn up for the invasion.

256
00:17:54,480 --> 00:17:55,680
I spoke of my stepfather earlier.

257
00:17:55,680 --> 00:17:58,279
My father was getting ready to be part of that invasion force.

258
00:17:58,440 --> 00:18:01,200
What was MacArthur’s role in planning that invasion?

259
00:18:01,220 --> 00:18:03,730
And if he had a role in that, what were his plans?

260
00:18:03,780 --> 00:18:05,140
What did those plans look like?

261
00:18:05,530 --> 00:18:09,100
Well, you know, I think that’s a question that Franklin Roosevelt

262
00:18:09,120 --> 00:18:12,739
and George Marshall probably asked themselves multiple times.

263
00:18:12,740 --> 00:18:15,659
What in the world are we going to do with Douglas MacArthur?

264
00:18:16,090 --> 00:18:18,359
Because all along, throughout the war, there have

265
00:18:18,370 --> 00:18:21,970
been these twin drives westward across the Pacific.

266
00:18:22,220 --> 00:18:25,720
Nimitz through the Central Pacific and MacArthur from

267
00:18:25,730 --> 00:18:29,270
New Guinea, kind of Northwest toward the Philippines.

268
00:18:29,679 --> 00:18:36,780
And eventually, by early-1945 they converge on the Philippines.

269
00:18:36,810 --> 00:18:39,710
And then the question is, does Nimitz lead the

270
00:18:39,710 --> 00:18:42,439
operation against Japan, or does MacArthur?

271
00:18:43,179 --> 00:18:46,010
MacArthur, of course, as we’ve mentioned, has

272
00:18:46,030 --> 00:18:49,750
always simply wanted to return to the Philippines.

273
00:18:49,940 --> 00:18:50,889
He’s done that.

274
00:18:50,900 --> 00:18:56,390
He’s liberated Manila at a horrendous cost—this is February, March of

275
00:18:56,400 --> 00:19:02,570
1945—and of course, the forces under Nimitz are going to get into, again,

276
00:19:02,610 --> 00:19:09,660
another horrific campaign of literally, yard-by-yard fighting on Okinawa.

277
00:19:09,849 --> 00:19:16,240
But then the question is, what does MacArthur do in terms of invading Japan?

278
00:19:16,560 --> 00:19:21,010
And finally, in April 1945, he’s made

279
00:19:21,050 --> 00:19:25,130
commander-in-chief of all US Army forces in the Pacific.

280
00:19:25,440 --> 00:19:29,830
Now, Nimitz is still going to be commanding all naval forces.

281
00:19:30,070 --> 00:19:31,149
It’s kind of interesting.

282
00:19:31,360 --> 00:19:35,710
MacArthur, as soon as his order is printed, MacArthur’s chief

283
00:19:35,710 --> 00:19:39,310
of staff and some of his other officers race into Nimitz’s

284
00:19:39,750 --> 00:19:43,590
headquarters like they’re going to start giving orders and take over.

285
00:19:43,740 --> 00:19:44,779
And, you know, no.

286
00:19:44,929 --> 00:19:47,639
The Joint Chiefs of staff, their intent

287
00:19:47,660 --> 00:19:50,460
was that this is kind of a slow transition.

288
00:19:50,950 --> 00:19:55,690
And Nimitz has really still got the ball until the American

289
00:19:55,690 --> 00:20:00,680
troops are going to go ashore at Kyushu with the Invasion of

290
00:20:00,680 --> 00:20:05,469
Japan, which by that point, is being set for November of 1945.

291
00:20:05,670 --> 00:20:08,590
When did MacArthur learn about the atomic bomb, and

292
00:20:08,650 --> 00:20:11,520
what ultimately did he think about its use in Japan?

293
00:20:12,190 --> 00:20:17,200
MacArthur is not told about the atomic bomb until really late-1945, and the

294
00:20:17,210 --> 00:20:22,189
reason, of course, is that Marshall and the Joint Chiefs don’t want him knowing

295
00:20:22,190 --> 00:20:27,200
about it because they’re afraid, in typical MacArthur fashion, he’s going to go

296
00:20:27,200 --> 00:20:32,629
ahead and put it in his communiques, or talk to the press about it, or whatever.

297
00:20:32,900 --> 00:20:36,019
So, he’s told very late in the process.

298
00:20:36,320 --> 00:20:40,560
And of course, Nimitz and King are more involved with it

299
00:20:40,570 --> 00:20:43,959
because of some of the naval operations and everything.

300
00:20:43,990 --> 00:20:46,670
I’m curious if he realized the importance in

301
00:20:46,670 --> 00:20:49,550
terms of warfare right away that that weapon made.

302
00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:51,800
I don’t know if that’s something you researched or not.

303
00:20:52,410 --> 00:20:57,890
He’s on record as saying in his memoirs that he thought the use

304
00:20:57,900 --> 00:21:04,940
was completely unnecessary, but that’s an after-the-fact comment.

305
00:21:05,660 --> 00:21:09,349
And at the same time he’s making that, he’s

306
00:21:09,400 --> 00:21:13,940
arguing for the invasion of the Home Islands.

307
00:21:14,719 --> 00:21:19,380
There are people in the Navy, including Chester Nimitz, who

308
00:21:19,380 --> 00:21:24,790
are more interested in simply blockading Japanese islands

309
00:21:24,860 --> 00:21:29,210
and trying to use that blockade to force a surrender.

310
00:21:29,960 --> 00:21:35,770
And you know, from MacArthur’s side and his ego side, one is tempted

311
00:21:35,770 --> 00:21:41,949
to suggest that he really wants the invasion to go forward because,

312
00:21:41,980 --> 00:21:46,459
by that time, I think it probably would have been the largest

313
00:21:46,630 --> 00:21:52,590
amphibious operation in American history, even greater than Normandy.

314
00:21:52,900 --> 00:21:55,090
And of course, who would the commander have

315
00:21:55,090 --> 00:21:58,170
been at that point but Douglas MacArthur?

316
00:21:58,200 --> 00:21:59,840
It would have been a horrible, bloody affair, if you

317
00:21:59,840 --> 00:22:03,220
just look at Okinawa as an example, and then much, much

318
00:22:03,250 --> 00:22:05,090
larger, you’re going into the Japanese home islands.

319
00:22:05,090 --> 00:22:08,200
I think that’s another debate for another day, Walt.

320
00:22:08,450 --> 00:22:11,189
It is, but it would have been horrific, Alan.

321
00:22:11,190 --> 00:22:12,529
That is for sure.

322
00:22:12,680 --> 00:22:17,405
So, we all know later—and we don’t get into this in your book; you stop at the

323
00:22:17,405 --> 00:22:21,110
end of World War II—but we know that MacArthur later plays a very important

324
00:22:21,110 --> 00:22:24,510
role in Korea, and then has the big falling out with President Truman.

325
00:22:24,510 --> 00:22:27,860
But at the end of World War II, with the death of FDR and

326
00:22:27,860 --> 00:22:31,000
President Truman now in office, Truman appoints him to be

327
00:22:31,160 --> 00:22:34,550
supreme commander for the Allied powers to govern Japan.

328
00:22:34,550 --> 00:22:36,350
So, why did Truman do that?

329
00:22:37,610 --> 00:22:43,310
Well, that appointment comes on August 15th of 1945, which is

330
00:22:43,310 --> 00:22:47,939
indeed the date that Japan signals it’s going to surrender.

331
00:22:48,340 --> 00:22:52,100
As we know, the formal ceremonies don’t take place until

332
00:22:52,140 --> 00:22:56,819
September 2nd, 1945 on the deck of the battleship Missouri.

333
00:22:57,349 --> 00:23:01,559
But at that point, certainly America has borne the brunt

334
00:23:01,660 --> 00:23:05,159
of the Pacific campaign, but there are definitely allies.

335
00:23:05,199 --> 00:23:09,629
I mean, Australia and New Zealand too, have been heavily involved.

336
00:23:09,860 --> 00:23:13,380
And of course, the British have been heavily involved, particularly

337
00:23:13,390 --> 00:23:18,659
on the western aspects of MacArthur’s theater of operations.

338
00:23:19,070 --> 00:23:22,879
So, I think the short answer to your question is that

339
00:23:23,000 --> 00:23:27,930
Truman, and including the Joint Chiefs and Admiral Leahy,

340
00:23:29,160 --> 00:23:32,680
really feel that MacArthur is the logical one to do it.

341
00:23:32,960 --> 00:23:38,089
He’s the one who’s commanded, also, these Allied troops with the Australians

342
00:23:38,090 --> 00:23:44,910
and New Zealanders, so he’s the appropriate person to be the supreme

343
00:23:44,910 --> 00:23:51,800
allied commander, except the Japanese surrender on behalf of the allies.

344
00:23:52,010 --> 00:23:55,230
And then, of course, Nimitz, because of his role, is going to

345
00:23:55,240 --> 00:24:00,729
be the one who signs the surrender documents for the Americans.

346
00:24:00,729 --> 00:24:03,490
And of course, now MacArthur also has to deal with

347
00:24:03,690 --> 00:24:06,210
the Soviets who came in late to the war against Japan.

348
00:24:06,760 --> 00:24:07,520
Indeed.

349
00:24:07,560 --> 00:24:12,760
And that invasion through Manchuria, and there’s certainly concern

350
00:24:12,760 --> 00:24:15,909
on MacArthur’s part what the Russians—or Soviets, at that point,

351
00:24:15,929 --> 00:24:20,630
technically—might be doing in terms of the northern islands of Japan.

352
00:24:20,940 --> 00:24:24,190
So, he wants to move very quickly once the surrender

353
00:24:24,190 --> 00:24:27,530
is done, to really get American troops on the ground.

354
00:24:27,880 --> 00:24:33,950
And you know, when you think of how much resistance the Japanese have put

355
00:24:33,969 --> 00:24:40,360
up, it really is pretty amazing that there, once the surrender is announced.

356
00:24:41,010 --> 00:24:44,430
And I think MacArthur understood the role of the

357
00:24:44,430 --> 00:24:49,330
emperor in announcing that and saying, “We’re done.”

358
00:24:49,719 --> 00:24:53,910
And you know, the question might be asked, well, why does MacArthur

359
00:24:53,990 --> 00:24:57,640
take on this role of administering Japan and everything else?

360
00:24:58,120 --> 00:25:02,480
But give MacArthur credit that going all the way back to his early

361
00:25:02,480 --> 00:25:08,280
experiences in Japan as a young aide to his military father, that

362
00:25:08,280 --> 00:25:13,190
MacArthur really does understand and appreciate the Japanese culture,

363
00:25:13,550 --> 00:25:17,889
the system with the Emperor, and the general politics of Japan.

364
00:25:17,980 --> 00:25:18,350
Yeah.

365
00:25:18,750 --> 00:25:21,330
Pretty masterful job overall there in Japan.

366
00:25:21,950 --> 00:25:25,230
This is going to be an unfair question to close this out today, Walt, but

367
00:25:25,460 --> 00:25:30,479
how would you, in overall fashion, define MacArthur’s legacy in World War II?

368
00:25:31,380 --> 00:25:33,900
I think there’s kind of two pieces to that.

369
00:25:34,300 --> 00:25:36,659
The one piece is psychological.

370
00:25:37,200 --> 00:25:40,460
MacArthur, particularly in the first months of

371
00:25:40,600 --> 00:25:46,220
1942, really becomes the hero that America needed.

372
00:25:46,719 --> 00:25:50,080
His, “I shall return,” is a rallying cry.

373
00:25:50,490 --> 00:25:54,710
Admittedly, he’s the only one out there putting out some of

374
00:25:54,720 --> 00:25:57,820
these communiques because the Navy certainly doesn’t want

375
00:25:57,820 --> 00:26:01,590
to put out communiques and suggest where their ships are.

376
00:26:01,799 --> 00:26:07,100
MacArthur, through those communiques and the fact that this great rallying cry

377
00:26:07,100 --> 00:26:12,510
of, “I shall return,” I think he’s the hero that America desperately needs.

378
00:26:12,550 --> 00:26:15,770
And I think he comes to personify the American success.

379
00:26:15,770 --> 00:26:19,990
He’s kind of the face of victory in a way that no one else

380
00:26:20,000 --> 00:26:25,110
is in the Pacific, with the possible exception of Admiral

381
00:26:25,110 --> 00:26:28,930
Halsey after he begins the operations through the Solomons.

382
00:26:29,350 --> 00:26:34,550
Now, the second piece of that is, what is his legacy militarily?

383
00:26:34,690 --> 00:26:37,479
And we’ve talked about combined operations.

384
00:26:37,929 --> 00:26:42,050
Again, today, we take it for granted that air, land, and sea are going

385
00:26:42,050 --> 00:26:47,510
to work all together, but that definitely wasn’t the case in 1941, in

386
00:26:47,510 --> 00:26:54,240
1942, and I think to MacArthur’s credit, he finds strong leaders for each

387
00:26:54,240 --> 00:27:00,149
of those arms, and they work well together, and they need to do so in

388
00:27:00,170 --> 00:27:06,710
terms of the far-flung and varied terrain of his theater of operations.

389
00:27:07,050 --> 00:27:12,020
But today that’s a given that it’s combined operations,

390
00:27:12,250 --> 00:27:14,970
and I think MacArthur deserves a lot of credit for that.

391
00:27:15,469 --> 00:27:18,310
Truly an incredible and important story in our history.

392
00:27:18,320 --> 00:27:20,140
I really appreciate you bringing that to us.

393
00:27:20,400 --> 00:27:22,160
Walt, what are you working on right now?

394
00:27:22,160 --> 00:27:23,840
I know you always have a book in the works.

395
00:27:24,500 --> 00:27:28,780
Well, Alan, I’m trying to finish up a post-war history of the American West.

396
00:27:28,860 --> 00:27:31,800
I want to talk about the themes of natural resources,

397
00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:35,610
water, transportation, land use, and, you know, amid

398
00:27:35,660 --> 00:27:38,790
a huge population growth in the Rocky Mountain West.

399
00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:41,450
So, trying to put some finishing touches on that one.

400
00:27:41,550 --> 00:27:43,040
I was just out in Los Angeles.

401
00:27:43,040 --> 00:27:46,390
I used to live out there years ago, and water issues,

402
00:27:46,469 --> 00:27:50,929
a fairly important topic in post-war western states.

403
00:27:50,960 --> 00:27:52,640
I’m looking forward to that book, Walt.

404
00:27:52,990 --> 00:27:54,349
When do you think that’d be out?

405
00:27:54,570 --> 00:27:58,730
That’s a good question, Alan [laugh] . Don’t push me on that one.

406
00:27:58,730 --> 00:28:00,417
I’m working on it [laugh]

407
00:28:00,417 --> 00:28:03,070
.
We’ll let our listeners know when it does come out, for sure.

408
00:28:03,080 --> 00:28:03,550
How’s that?

409
00:28:03,570 --> 00:28:04,590
That sounds like a plan.

410
00:28:04,590 --> 00:28:05,340
I appreciate it.

411
00:28:05,559 --> 00:28:06,640
Well, Walt, thank you so much.

412
00:28:06,640 --> 00:28:08,179
I enjoyed our conversation as always.

413
00:28:08,179 --> 00:28:09,809
Thanks for joining us on AMSEcast.

414
00:28:10,230 --> 00:28:11,179
Good to be with you, Alan.

415
00:28:11,219 --> 00:28:11,620
Thanks.

416
00:28:16,720 --> 00:28:19,550
Thank you for joining us on this episode of AMSEcast.

417
00:28:19,770 --> 00:28:24,100
For more information on this topic or any others, you can always visit us at

418
00:28:24,309 --> 00:28:30,820
AMSE.org or find, like, and follow us on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.

419
00:28:31,230 --> 00:28:33,560
I invite you to visit the American Museum of Science

420
00:28:33,560 --> 00:28:36,370
and Energy and the K-25 History Center in person.

421
00:28:36,680 --> 00:28:40,840
You can also shop at our online store and become a member at AMSE.org.

422
00:28:41,300 --> 00:28:44,750
Thanks to our production team with Matt Mullins, plus our supportive colleagues

423
00:28:44,750 --> 00:28:48,590
at the Department of Energy’s Office of Science, Office of Environmental

424
00:28:48,590 --> 00:28:52,570
Management, and Office of Legacy Management, as well as Oak Ridge National

425
00:28:52,570 --> 00:28:58,409
Laboratory, the Y-12 National Security Complex, NNSA, and the AMSE Foundation.

426
00:28:58,920 --> 00:29:00,649
And of course, thanks to our wonderful guests

427
00:29:00,650 --> 00:29:02,489
today, and to all of you for listening.

428
00:29:02,969 --> 00:29:05,830
I hope you’ll join us for the next episode of AMSEcast.

429
00:29:05,830 --> 00:29:05,850
If

430
00:29:08,510 --> 00:29:11,340
you’ve enjoyed this podcast, I would like to ask that you consider

431
00:29:11,340 --> 00:29:15,920
becoming a member of the 117 Society, the newest membership opportunity

432
00:29:15,969 --> 00:29:19,429
offered by the American Museum of Science and Energy Foundation.

433
00:29:20,190 --> 00:29:23,370
By joining the 117 Society, you will help us continue

434
00:29:23,370 --> 00:29:26,169
this podcast and our other innovative programming.

435
00:29:26,570 --> 00:29:29,480
You will support the expansion of our vitally important educational

436
00:29:29,480 --> 00:29:33,360
outreach, including virtual classes, and you will help ensure that both

437
00:29:33,370 --> 00:29:37,999
the American Museum of Science and Energy and the K-25 History Center can

438
00:29:38,000 --> 00:29:42,069
continue to provide world-class exhibits to our community and to the world.

439
00:29:42,910 --> 00:29:45,780
Benefits of membership includes special access to video

440
00:29:45,780 --> 00:29:49,990
and audio content, and 117 Society merchandise, as well

441
00:29:49,990 --> 00:29:52,940
as all the benefits of our Atom Splitter Membership Level.

442
00:29:53,509 --> 00:29:55,809
To learn more, go to AMSE.org.

443
00:29:56,900 --> 00:30:01,680
The 117 Society is vital to the future of AMSE and the K-25 History Center.

444
00:30:02,080 --> 00:30:04,680
I hope you will consider joining, and thank you very much.